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ABSTRACT
Soft law and governance captured the attention of scholars in the 2000s, and
new policy challenges and the novel introduction of ‘harder’ elements now drive
a (re)turn to these discussions. This article explores the extent to which dynamics
leading towards ‘harder soft governance’ (HSG) appear in the EU’s renewable
energy governance by comparing the 2020 and 2030 Renewable Energy
Directives. Document analysis and interviews reveal a surface-level softening
because the new 2030 directive contains no binding national targets for the
Member States. An entrepreneurial Commission has been seeking to introduce
‘harder elements’ at the core by focusing on implementation, allowing for poten-
tially deeper influence on the national energy mixes though the Energy Union.
Two main factors drive these changes: the evolving international context of cli-
mate change governance, as well as re-configurations of the actors in the EU.
Future research should explore the effectiveness of emerging HSG in detail.
KEYWORDS Soft law; soft governance; harder soft governance (HSG); renewable energy; Energy
Union; policy monitoring; European Union
Academic debates on ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ governance, as well as on the related
concepts of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ law, are receiving increasing scholarly attention
(e.g. Eliantonio and Stefan 2018; Graziano and Halpern 2016; Saurugger and
Terpan 2016; Terpan 2015). In the 2000s, soft governance approaches such as
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) (e.g. Radaelli 2003; Tholoniat
2010; Trubek and Trubek 2005) were extensively debated, and substantial
policy developments and pressing coordination challenges have prompted
scholars to return to earlier thinking. Understanding the (re)turn to softer
steering approaches in various substantial policy fields in European Union
(EU) studies is especially important because forging agreement among the
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EU Member States appears increasingly difficult. An important emerging
insight is that the new soft governance frequently contains ‘harder’ elements,
as Knodt (2019) demonstrates in the case of EU climate and energy policy.
While descriptive accounts of this novel phenomenon have emerged from
various quarters (e.g. Oberth€ur 2019), explanations of the respective shifts
between soft and hard governance over time do not yet exist. This article
addresses this gap by analysing and explaining the dynamic balance between
soft and hard governance in the area of EU renewable energy governance.
Energy governance has characteristically espoused a mix between
shared and no EU competence, but there is now increasing pressure on
the Member States to move towards coordination. These characteristics
make it a suitable policy field to look for soft and hard elements in con-
junction. To do so, this article focuses in on the evolution of EU-level
renewable energy policy. Renewable energy development constitutes an
important contribution to the significant efforts required to reduce green-
house gas emissions to contain global warming to well below 2 degrees
Celsius in line with the 2015 Paris Agreement. Renewable energy sources,
including biomass, geothermal, solar, and wind energy and hydropower,
do not rely on emission-intensive fossil fuels and replenish themselves
through natural processes. This article analyses renewable energy policy
in the context of the soft-hard governance typology proposed by Terpan
(2015) and refined by Saurugger and Terpan (2020) for this special issue.
More specifically, this paper centres on the ‘Directive on the promo-
tion of the use of energy from renewable sources’ (2009/28/EC) – here-
after the ‘2020 Renewable Energy Directive’, as well as its revision in the
Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources
(recast) (2018/2001) – hereafter the ‘2030 Renewable Energy Directive’.
These directives were negotiated and eventually adopted in the periods
from 2007 to 2008 and 2014 to 2018, respectively. The analysis also takes
into account relevant elements of the recent Energy Union Governance
Regulation (Regulation 2018/1999; R€oben 2018). This paper considers
existing academic debates in novel ways, analyses legislative and policy
documents, and draws on fresh evidence from seven interviews with staff
of Member State permanent representations, national ministries and the
European Commission (hereafter the ‘Commission’) conducted in the
context of the Kopernikus ENavi project.1 The following section unpacks
the soft-hard governance typology, which is then applied in in the section
thereafter to assess the 2020 and 2030 Renewable Energy Directives. Then
the fourth section endeavours to explain the observed shifts in the renew-
able energy policy. Finally, the last section draws these factors together,
elaborates on their connections and concludes with future
research directions.
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Assessing and explaining shifts between soft and
hard governance
This article starts with the typology proposed by Terpan (2015), which is
further elaborated in the introduction to this special issue (Saurugger and
Terpan 2020), to distinguish between soft and hard law as well as non-
legal norms on the basis of the ‘nature of the obligation’ (hard, soft or
none) and the ‘nature of the enforcement mechanism’ (hard, soft, or
none).2 This typology constitutes a refinement of earlier efforts at charac-
terising ‘legalisation’, which may be understood ‘… as a particular form
of institutionalisation characterised by three components: obligation, pre-
cision, and delegation’ (Abbott and others 2000: 401). Saurugger and
Terpan (2020) argue that if the content of an obligation is very precise, it
is harder than an obligation that remains vague or unclear. Analogously,
an enforcement mechanism that relies on the judicial system is harder
than one that relies on surveillance and monitoring practices or more
informal ‘naming and shaming’ (Sch€afer 2006). Given the EU’s complex
institutional structures, applying the concept of legalisation from inter-
national law generates significant challenges because the concept struggles
to accommodate the wide range of actors and mechanisms that the EU
uses to enforce its legislation (see Mattocks 2018; Sch€afer 2006; Trubek
and Trubek 2005). We therefore adapt and extend the typology to distin-
guish between soft and hard elements at the surface and at the core. The
surface of a law/governance approach comprises the more visible, public,
and openly politicised elements, such as headline European or national
targets. Surface items tend to generate political force by keeping issues on
political agendas and by providing public yardsticks for assessing policy
effects over time. By contrast, the core of law and governance contains
the less visible, potentially more technical and sometimes purposefully de-
politicised, implementation-related elements that likely contribute to pol-
icy success and involve multiple actors. Crucially, soft and hard elements
at the surface and at the core are not static but may change over time.
Observing such changes in soft and hard governance invariably gener-
ates demand for explaining them. In the introduction to this special issue,
Saurugger and Terpan (2020) assume that at least three broad classes of
factors may drive such processes, namely, changes in the context, such as
crises or more long-running trends; the legal norm itself and its perceived
effectiveness or ineffectiveness; and finally, the actor configurations that
surround the legal norm. This article investigates two promising catego-
ries of potential causal drivers proposed by Saurugger and Terpan (2020),
namely, how changes in the (international) context and the dynamic and
evolving configuration of actors have affected the balance between soft
and hard governance in the area of renewable energy.
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Analysing soft and hard EU renewable energy governance
Understanding the broader context of renewable energy governance
The origins of EU energy governance date back to the foundation of the
European Community and eventually crystallised into a three-pronged
approach focusing on security, sustainability, and competitiveness
(Hoerber 2013; Knodt 2018). Serious discussions on renewable energy
policy at the EU level commenced in the 1980s and 1990s (see Haigh
1996), when the European Community first began to coordinate Member
State approaches and later began setting targets for renewable energy
expansion (Howes 2010). EU action on renewables thus originated from
efforts to improve the sustainability and security of the European energy
supply and from the ambition to better coordinate the various different
support schemes emerging in the Member States (Hildingsson et al. 2012;
Knodt 2018).
By the mid-2000s, it had become increasingly clear that the early vol-
untary (i.e. soft) efforts to stimulate renewables proved insufficient to
reach the self-imposed targets (such as producing 22.1% of all
Community electricity from renewables by 2010), difficulties that became
clear in the implementation of the Renewable Electricity Directive (2001/
77/EC) (Solorio and Bocquillon 2017). Consequently, the EU instituted
more stringent, legally binding targets in the 2020 Renewable Energy
Directive (Hildingsson et al. 2010; Kanellakis et al. 2013). Introducing
mandatory targets proved politically contentious with opposition from
particular Member States, but the Commission and the European
Parliament were in favour of such action (Hildingsson et al. 2010). Such
resistance emerged even though the directives allow the Member States to
reach their targets flexibly (see Trubek and Trubek 2005: 360–61). The
2020 Renewable Energy Directive left the precise national renewable mix
up to the Member States because different kinds of renewables (e.g. those
based on wind, sun, water, or biomass) were technically or politically
more effective/feasible than others, given national topography and polit-
ical constellations.
The 2020 Renewable Energy Directive
The 2020 Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC) was adopted as part of
the Climate and Energy Package in 2008. At that time, European leaders
sought to put in place ambitious measures to lead and demand action from
others at the 2009 climate change summit in Copenhagen (Solorio and
Bocquillon 2017). The political moment was propitious, with a German
presidency of the European Council from January-June 2007, where
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Chancellor Angela Merkel brokered an agreement on a set of comparatively
ambitious targets at a key European Council meeting in March 2007
(B€urgin 2015; Solorio and Bocquillon 2017). These efforts ultimately culmi-
nated in the EU’s 2020 Climate and Energy Package, which, in addition to
setting targets for greenhouse gas emission reduction and energy efficiency
(not addressed here), included a new and for the first time relatively com-
prehensive directive on stimulating renewable energy. The 2020 Renewable
Energy Directive prescribes that EU countries must generate 20% of their
final energy consumption from renewables by 2020 and achieve a share of
at least 10% of renewables in transport (Article 3). Major areas of conten-
tion included whether to create harmonised support schemes at the EU
level (not pursued) and the bindingness of the overall target (Boasson and
Wettestad 2016). The 2020 Renewable Energy Directive allocates an indi-
vidual target to each Member State (Article 3). To do so, the directive con-
tains a formula, which defines the legally binding contributions, building
on a flat rate increase in renewables of 5.5% in each country, and further
additions dependent on prior efforts, as well as the individual economic
situation of each Member State (European Commission 2008; Howes 2010;
Solorio and Bocquillon 2017). Table 1 details the national contributions
resulting from this process and set forth in the directive.
In order to ensure continuous progress, the directive introduced
National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAP) to be prepared by the
Member States (see Article 4), as well as regular progress reporting (see
Aldy 2014; Knodt 2019; Schoenefeld et al. 2018).3 The latest progress
report on renewable energy development from the Commission demon-
strates that the EU as a whole will likely achieve its renewable energy tar-
get but that continuous ‘sustained effort’ will be necessary because
renewable energy deployment has slowed since 2014 (European
Commission 2019b). In the case of non-compliance, countries may face
financial penalties through EU infringement procedures (Deutscher
Naturschutzring 2018, Interview June 2019). The Commission has already
sent notifications and/or begun infringement procedures against various
Member States, including Poland (European Commission 2017a) and
Ireland (European Commission 2014), related to the transposition of the
directive in the area of renewables in transport and other elements. The
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) can enforce Member
State renewable energy targets.
The 2030 Renewable Energy Directive
A landmark in renewable energy development planning beyond 2020
occurred during the European Council summit in October 2014; the
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European Council decided on the 2030 framework for climate and energy
policy, including a position for a new renewable energy target. The
European Council proposed increasing the target to ‘at least’ 27% renew-
ables in final energy consumption in the EU Member States by 2030
(European Council 2014). Intense discussion on whether there should be
a renewable target at all (as opposed to simply an overall greenhouse gas
emission reduction target) preceded this decision, with countries such as
Denmark and Germany, as well as renewable energy producers, strongly
in favour of a renewable-specific target (Fitch-Roy and Fairbrass 2018:
65–7). The target approach prevailed, and at the insistence of the
European Parliament (which preferred a 40% target), the renewable
energy target was eventually raised to 32% in 2018 (Article 3; Interview
June 2019) (European Parliament 2018).
The 2030 renewable energy target may be adjusted upwards in 2023
(European Commission 2018) if there are, for example, technological
developments that justify doing so (Article 3[1]) (Deutscher
Table 1. Renewables development in 2005 and national targets by 2020 in the 2020
Renewable Energy Directive.
Share of energy from
renewable sources in gross
final consumption of
energy, 2005
Target for share of energy
from renewable sources in
gross final consumption of
energy, 2020
Belgium 2,2 % 13 %
Bulgaria 9,4 % 16 %
Czech Republic 6,1 % 13 %
Denmark 17,0 % 30 %
Germany 5,8 % 18 %
Estonia 18,0 % 25 %
Ireland 3,1 % 16 %
Greece 6,9 % 18 %
Spain 8,7 % 20 %
France 10,3 % 23 %
Italy 5,2 % 17 %
Cyprus 2,9 % 13 %
Latvia 32,6 % 40 %
Lithuania 15,0 % 23 %
Luxembourg 0,9 % 11 %
Hungary 4,3 % 13 %
Malta 0,0 % 10 %
Netherlands 2,4 % 14 %
Austria 23,3 % 34 %
Poland 7,2 % 15 %
Portugal 20,5 % 31 %
Romania 17,8 % 24 %
Slovenia 16,0 % 25 %
Slovak Republic 6,7 % 14 %
Finland 28,5 % 38 %
Sweden 39,8 % 49 %
United Kingdom 1,3 % 15 %
Source: Directive 2009/28/EC, Annex I.
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Naturschutzring 2018). In contrast to the 2020 Renewable Energy
Directive, the new 2030 Renewable Energy Directive contains a binding
target at the EU level (Article 3) but does not directly define binding
national renewable targets. This approach emerged as a compromise
between North-Western Member States who by and large preferred ambi-
tious action on renewable energy and the Central and Eastern Member
States, who wanted to limit EU control over their national energy mixes
(Knodt 2018; see Fitch-Roy and Fairbrass 2018: 93). This setup may lead
to significant collective action problems, where Member States may
attempt to shift blame if they fail to collectively reach the EU-level target.
To address this issue in the planning and implementation phase, the
Energy Union Governance Regulation (Article 3, Regulation [EU] 2018/
1999) requires the Member States to report on their renewables in the
Integrated National Energy and Climate Plans. Member States have to
publish their plans in addition to submitting them to the Commission
(Article 3[4]). In particular, the national planning processes soon turned
into a way to build ‘structured dialogue’ between the Member States and
the Commission and thereby became much more than a mere reporting
instrument (Knodt 2019; Knodt et al. forthcoming). The plans allow the
Commission to assess both potential ‘ambition gaps’ or, further down the
line, ‘delivery gaps’ (Governance Regulation Preamble 56) (Knodt 2019),
and then take corrective action, which could, for example, happen
through additional financial mechanisms (Interview January 2018).
However, in addition to these enhancements, the Governance Regulation
also contains a new Annex (II), which includes a formula for calculating
indicative national renewable targets. The Commission did not initially
propose this formula, which was added during the trilogue negotiations
between the Commission, the Parliament and the Council (Knodt 2019;
Knodt et al. forthcoming; Oberth€ur 2019), at German insistence, as one
interviewee indicated (Interviews February 2018; June 2019). The formula
uses a similar approach to that applied in the 2020 Renewable Energy
Directive (see ‘The 2020 Renewable Energy Directive’), taking into
account the economic capabilities of each country, as well as the state of
its renewable development. However, in contrast to the 2020 Renewable
Energy Directive, the lack of binding, national renewable energy targets
means that the CJEU cannot enforce country-level progress/achievement.
Harder soft enforcement: reporting on renewable energy policy in
the Energy Union
In contrast to the 2020 Climate and Energy Package, the 2030 Climate
and Energy Framework now contributes to the ‘Energy Union’, a much
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more comprehensive effort to streamline climate and energy governance
across the EU (Knodt and Ringel 2018; Ringel and Knodt 2018; R€oben
2018; Szulecki and others 2016). While reporting on renewable energy has
long existed, usually conducted by the European Environment Agency
(e.g. European Environment Agency 2019), the Energy Union Regulation
bundles multiple reporting streams (including that of the 2030 Renewable
Energy Directive) and thereby lifts monitoring activities to a much more
prominent, and potentially political, level. This is especially the case
because the Commission regularly reports on progress in the Energy
Union through ‘State of the Energy Union’ reports. The Commission has
published four such reports to date, namely, in November 2015
(European Commission 2015), February 2017 (European Commission
2017b), November 2017 (European Commission 2017c), and April 2019
(European Commission 2019a). Given their prominent position, these
reports are a useful gauge to assess the importance of renewables in EU
energy governance.
Careful analysis revealed that renewables feature strongly in each
report, but the reports contain specific graphs on renewable deployment
in the EU only from February 2017 onwards (second report, see
European Commission 2017b: 4). Becoming more detailed over time,4 the
fourth report seeks to provide additional causal explanations of the green-
house gas emission trends observed, including the contributions emerging
from the renewable energy sector (European Commission 2019a). In
2019, the Commission for the first time provided detailed lists of coun-
tries that were on track to achieve their renewable energy targets and of
countries that still needed to do more (European Commission 2019a: 6).
These lists may be understood as a concrete effort at ‘praising and sham-
ing’ the renewable energy leaders and laggards and thereby harden the
softer monitoring processes outlined in the Energy Union Governance
Regulation (2018/1999) by means of additional publicity. The fact that the
Energy Union reports have to be formally presented to the European
Parliament and the Council (Regulation 2018/1999, Article 35) is further
evidence of the hardening trend (while Member States have to report to
the Commission, which in turn reports to the Parliament and the Council
on Renewables under the 2020 and 2030 Renewable Energy Directives,
the political prominence of the Energy Union reports signifies further
hardening). Compared to monitoring and reporting processes outlined in
the 2020 Renewable Energy Directive, the monitoring and reporting of
renewable energy development incorporated into the Energy Union
Regulation (linked with the 2030 Renewable Energy Directive) therefore
further limits the room in which Member States can manoeuvre and
streamlines implementation (Interview August 2017).
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Applying the Terpan typology to renewable energy governance
in Europe
Based on the typology and our surface/core extension, it is clear that the
2020 and 2030 Renewable Energy Directives differ. The 2020 directive
would very much qualify as ‘hard law’ in the sense that it contains both
precise national obligations for renewable development until 2020 (i.e. a
binding European headline target, as well as binding national targets), as
well as a ‘hard’ enforcement mechanism. The Member States regularly
report on their progress to the Commission, which has recourse to the
CJEU through infringement procedures. However, there appears to be
some retroactive ‘softening’ of the 2020 targets through the new 2030
Governance Regulation (thus blurring the lines between the two). For
technical reasons, it will only be possible to determine the level of renew-
able energy goal attainment under the 2020 Climate and Energy Package
by 2021. If countries are found to have deployed insufficient renewables
by then, they will have another year (until 2022) to remedy the situation.
Thus, any infringement procedures related to target achievement will
likely not commence until 2023, which also coincides with the first
reporting obligation for renewables under the new Governance
Regulation/the 2030 Renewable Energy Directive.
By contrast, in comparison to the 2020 Renewable Energy Directive,
the revised 2030 Renewable Energy Directive entails – especially at the
surface – a softening. The lack of consensus on visible nationally binding
renewable energy targets can be interpreted as a significant effort in sur-
face-based softening of renewable energy policies at the EU level.
However, we are simultaneously observing a process of ‘hardening’ the
‘softer’ provisions in the 2030 Renewable Energy Directive at the core
through the Energy Union Governance Regulation (Ringel and Knodt
2018; see Knodt and Ringel 2018; Knodt et al. forthcoming). The new for-
mula that emerged in the Governance Regulation (i.e. a separate piece of
legislation) in the late negotiation stages in 2018 de facto reintroduces a
way for the Commission to determine national targets (see ‘The 2030
Renewable Energy Directive’), and there are further efforts to introduce
sanctioning mechanisms through, for example, Implementing or
Delegated Acts, over which the Commission has much more control
(Knodt 2019; see also Energy Systems of the Future 2019). While the lat-
ter elements have not yet been fully agreed upon, both the surface obliga-
tions and the enforcement mechanism have been softened in the headline
legislation (i.e. the new 2030 Renewable Energy Directive compared to
that of 2020), but the Commission is seeking to ‘harden’ the enforcement
mechanism at the core through Energy Union reporting and the formula
(see Ringel and Knodt 2018). Some scholars have argued that this
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 9
reconfiguration between the 2020 and the 2030 directives amounts to little
change in the ‘hardness’ of renewable energy governance at the EU level
(see Oberth€ur 2019), but we believe that it is too soon to make this judge-
ment, as much of the softness and hardness of the 2030 Renewable
Energy Directive depends on its future implementation. Energy Union
reporting (see ‘Harder soft enforcement: reporting on renewable energy
policy in the Energy Union’) hardens the enforcement mechanism of the
2030 Renewable Energy Directive by raising the profile of renewable pol-
icy and increasing political visibility, including the possibility of naming
and shaming through high-level State of the Energy Union reports (see
Trubek and Trubek 2005). In sum, we detect softening at the surface but
a hardening of the core in renewable energy governance to 2030.
Explaining soft and hard EU renewable energy governance
This section seeks to explain changes in the legislation that we discussed
above – that is, the inability to agree on binding national renewable
energy targets in the 2030 framework (as compared to the 2020 frame-
work), as well as the enhancement of the enforcement mechanism of the
2030 Renewable Energy Directive through the formula and high-level
Energy Union reporting. We particularly focus on the context, as well as
on the configurations of actors as key potential explanatory factors of the
observed changes.
The global/international context of EU renewable energy policy
Evolving international climate change negotiations strongly influenced EU
renewable energy legislation in both cases – the 2020 and the 2030 direc-
tives. Both directives were negotiated as a part of broader packages,
namely, the 2020 Climate and Energy Package and the 2030 Climate and
Energy Framework. Renewable energy policy formed but one element of
the broader efforts to put forward credible EU-level policy proposals to
address climate change (Solorio and Bocquillon 2017). The EU has a long
history of attempting to provide global climate leadership vis-a-vis strong
domestic policy proposals and has thus often been perceived as an ambi-
tious promoter of renewables (Wurzel and Connelly 2011). However,
early in the creation of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), which forms the international legal backdrop
for EU climate action (Bodansky 1993), it had already become apparent
that leading at home was by no means easy, for example, efforts to
develop an agreement on a carbon tax failed in the early 1990s (Haigh
1996; Schoenefeld and Rayner 2019). In the mid-2000s, the EU and
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particularly Denmark – which is often described as one of the EU’s green
leaders (Dyrhauge 2017) – had a keen interest in delivering a strong over-
all package, as Denmark was to host the annual Conference of the Parties
(COP) to the UNFCCC in late 2009. Even though the EU succeeded in
negotiating the 2020 framework (and even offered to increase its own
effort if others were to follow suit), the Copenhagen summit was per-
ceived as a resounding failure at the time and weakened subsequent
renewable energy policy making within the EU (B€urgin 2015), even
though it eventually contributed to sparking a new approach to global cli-
mate change governance (Held and Roger 2018). This failure in turn
increased the need for action even more in the early 2010s when the EU
negotiated the 2030 framework, as the international community had
agreed to finalise a new, comprehensive climate change agreement in
2015. Once again, a European state (France) offered to host the negotia-
tions, which ultimately proved successful through the 2015 Paris
Agreement (Held and Roger 2018). Taken together, the ambition to
remain a leader in multilateral climate change governance prompted the
EU institutions and the EU Member States to revise EU renewable energy
legislation and make it as binding/hard as possible to gain credibility and
implement it successfully (Walker and Biedenkopf 2018, Interview
September 2017).
European countries, notably Germany, Spain, and Denmark, were also
instrumental in creating a more specific international renewable energy
governance architecture, including the ‘Renewable Energy Policy Network
for the 21st Century’5 and ultimately and most significantly, the
‘International Renewable Energy Agency’ (IRENA)6 (Meckling 2019).
Driven by the ambition to create global markets for their nascent renew-
able energy industries in the early 2000s and to export their policy
approaches and ultimately technologies (Steinbacher 2018), as well as by
increasing public concern over climate change and the need to reduce
emissions, these countries sought to build international support for
renewables that would allow the sector to stay firm in the face of rising
opposition from incumbent, large domestic energy companies (Meckling
2019). While this endeavour only partially succeeded (e.g. the most sig-
nificant solar panel manufacturers are now in China, while significant
parts of the wind industry have remained in Europe), these efforts led to
the creation of an international framework that has stimulated consider-
able momentum and a corresponding expectation of continued, ambitious
EU renewable energy development.
Finally, politics and public opinion became more negative towards
renewable energy between the negotiation of the 2020 and the 2030
Renewable Energy Directives, as the example of Germany shows. In
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particular, the debate on the cost of the surcharge (a levy on energy bills
used for supporting renewables) stipulated in the German Renewable
Energy Sources Act (EEG) started gathering steam in Germany, so much
so that the Merkel III coalition between the conservatives and the social
democrats (2013–2017) found it legally and politically expedient to revise
the EEG in 2014 with a view to reducing the levy (Vogelpohl and others
2017). This debate on costs – developing more force given the aftermath
of the 2008 financial crisis and its economic impact on various European
countries – put further pressure on similar feed-in-tariff systems in vari-
ous countries, notably, Spain (Solorio and Fernandez 2017). Italy and
Portugal were also adversely affected. Our interviews revealed that
Germany in particular became a signifier of what not to do because other
countries became concerned about the costs of the Energiewende
(Interview January 2018) and therefore about the means to reach ambi-
tious renewable energy targets. In summary, mounting international pres-
sure to act, the domestic ambitions of leadership, and the key role of EU
Member States in brokering international agreements are key explanatory
factors of why the EU continued to look for ways to make its own renew-
able energy governance after 2020 as binding as possible, even though the
domestic political and legal backdrop had become significantly more chal-
lenging for renewable energy policy in the meantime.
Actor configuration
Another important area identified by Saurugger and Terpan (2020) con-
cerns shifting actor configurations affecting changes in renewable energy
law and governance. We identify two key trends: On the one hand, there
is a gradual strengthening of the Commission’s leverage in implementing
renewable energy legislation over time. On the other hand, there is a rela-
tive weakening of the Member States, but this has also been counteracted
by some more recent developments, including the role of the European
Parliament. This section discusses both effects in turn.
The Commission plays a key role in this process. In proposing the tar-
gets, it moved from stressing international climate leadership (2020
Renewable Energy Directive) to emphasising cost-effectiveness in the
negotiations for the 2030 Renewable Energy Directive; in particular, the
then Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger has been ascribed a cen-
tral role in advocating for lower EU-level targets for renewables and non-
binding national targets (B€urgin 2015). Since there are no binding
national targets in the 2030 Renewable Energy Directive, the Commission
has subsequently made several attempts to gain leverage over the Member
States in the implementation process (Knodt and Ringel 2018). The
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introduction of the formula used to calculate the renewable energy shares
for each Member State in the Governance Regulation has clearly strength-
ened the hand of the Commission, even though Member States explicitly
objected against national targets (Knodt 2018; Knodt and Ringel 2018).
The role of the Commission was complemented by the European Council
and the European Parliament’s role in building political agreement on the
targets – especially in 2014, when the European Council strongly steered
towards the use of specific policy instruments.7
Second, the weakening of some pro-renewable energy Member States
must be understood in terms of two general trends: Domestically, a num-
ber of traditional renewable energy leader states have been perceived to
be struggling to fulfil their national 2020 targets, a development that
weakened their leadership and clout in the negotiations of the 2030
Renewable Energy Directive because they could no longer claim to be
leaders in the movement. For example, countries such as Germany,
France and Spain may not achieve their 2020 renewable energy targets,
prompting the European Environment Agency to state that ‘further efforts
to deploy renewable energy sources across the EU are needed’, especially
to address rebound effects (European Environment Agency 2019: 1).
Figure 1 shows that even though some of the smaller Member States have
either already reached their targets or are very close to them at the
time of this writing, the potential failure of some of the largest Member
States to deliver may lead to possible under-achievement at the European
level. This is, in part, because fossil fuel consumption as a form of energy
generation has increased across Europe (European Environment
Agency 2019).
An additional factor related to actor configurations and influencing the
negotiation of the 2030 framework is the 2004 EU enlargement. On 1
May 2004, ten new members joined the EU, representing the largest num-
ber of new members in its history (see O’Brennan 2006) – followed by
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Given the substantial amount of legisla-
tion that had to be adopted to incorporate the acquis communautaire into
national law and to effect the related administrative, organisational, and
political changes, the new Member States were still in the adjustment
phase when the 2020 Renewable Energy Directive was negotiated. These
new Member States were unlikely to upset the political balance too much
in the early years and prioritised other elements such as the Emissions
Trading System in the negotiations.8 By the mid-2010s, when the negoti-
ation for the 2030 Renewable Energy Directive was underway with a view
to the 2015 COP in Paris, this situation had changed. With more self-
confidence and bolstered by a rising anti-European sentiment at home,
many governments of the Visegrad Group opposed strong regulation on
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renewable energies (and especially binding, national-level targets), arguing
that the Member States should stay in full control of choosing their
energy sources (Interview August 2017); (even though some differences
do emerge in this group on renewables; see Cetkovic and Buzogany
2019). In particular, countries such as Poland were keen to retain control
over their national energy mix to exploit their national coal resources and
ensure the security of their supply (Solorio and Bocquillon 2017), lest
they become dependent on Russian oil and gas, a situation that continues
to be highly politically unattractive for the Polish people, especially in
light of the recent Ukrainian gas crises (Zoll 2020). In our interviews,
Polish representatives also stressed the need to retain flexibility because
renewable energy expansion tends to be nonlinear and expansion costs
tend to decrease over time (Interview March 2018). However, others out-
side the Visegrad Group, such as Romania, discovered that they were
over-delivering on the 2020 target, especially because of biomass use from
agriculture (Interview January 2018; see also Figure 1).
Another line of conflict affecting actor constellations was debates on
‘technology neutrality’ with regards to climate policy. A ‘technology neu-
tral’ climate policy would impose a single, greenhouse gas emission reduc-
tion target, with Member State using their own discretion on how they
would achieve it. The logical opposite is directly supporting certain tech-
nologies, such as renewables. A debate followed on whether or not to set
a specific renewable energy target (Solorio and Bocquillon 2017). Member
Figure 1. Actual and approximated RES shares in the EU and its Member States.
Notes: The dark blue bars show the RES shares in 2005. The tops of the light blue bars show the lev-
els that the RES shares reached in 2017. Colour online.
Sources: Figure provided by the European Environment Agency, based on European Environment
Agency (2019).
Data available at: https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/energy/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-in-
europe-2019a
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States such as Denmark and Germany were in favour of a target whilst
the UK, Poland, and the Netherlands preferred a technology neutral
approach to retain flexibility (Interview January 2018), thus weakening
overall Member State support for renewables (B€urgin 2015; Fitch-Roy and
Fairbrass 2018: 65–7). Furthermore, a strong coalition of business groups
supported the single target approach and ultimately, weakened renewable
energy advocacy was unable to exert strong pressure (Fitch-Roy et al.
2019). In the end, the 2030 Renewable Energy Directive amounts to a
degree of ‘renationalization of the EU renewable energy policy’s govern-
ance structure’ (Solorio and Bocquillon 2017: 35), as it does not define
binding national targets.
This debate originated from diverging Member State preferences over
domestic energy use. A long-standing conflict over the use and exploit-
ation of nuclear power flared up again and contributed to disunity
regarding renewables. Countries such as the UK, France, Poland, and the
Czech Republic have emphasised their desire to exploit nuclear resources
(B€urgin 2015) and therefore strategically pushed for ‘technology neutral-
ity’ in European targets, even though our interviews revealed that with
current electricity market prices, nuclear development is not financially
viable (Interview January 2018). Other countries, such as Germany,
Denmark, Spain, Italy and Austria, which contain significant domestic
anti-nuclear social movements, have been in favour of giving privileges
to certain (renewable) technologies and therefore emphasised the need
for European (and national) renewable energy targets. The political com-
promise that emerged in the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework
reflects these tensions, given that a more ambitious greenhouse gas
emission reduction target was set with a renewable target that is just
slightly above business as usual projections (Solorio and Bocquillon
2017) – even though the European Parliament managed to raise this tar-
get above the original Commission proposal. The overt softening at the
surface with more covert hardening at the core must thus be understood
as an effort by the Commission to gain leverage in implementation and
an effort by the Parliament to push for greater ambition; Member State
disunity regarding various substantive policy issues has tempered some
of these ambitions.
Conclusions and future directions
This article set out to analyse the more recent development of renewable
energy legislation in the EU in light of the soft-versus-hard law and gov-
ernance debate entertained in this special issue. We discovered softening
at the surface but hardening at the core when comparing the 2020 and
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2030 Renewable Energy Directives, which may be described as an
increased hardening of softer elements in this policy area. We also
revealed that while the Terpan (2015) typology is useful for describing the
processes of (de)legalisation, it struggles to capture key surface and core
effects, including softening of the EU renewables targets, and hardening
through various linkages with the Energy Union governance (high-level
reporting, defining indicative national targets). The corresponding entre-
preneurial efforts of particular institutions such as the Commission and
some Member States in bringing about legal and governance changes are
not easily captured by the typology but contribute to an emerging debate
in this area (Mattocks 2018; Knodt and Ringel 2018; see B€urgin 2015;
Knodt et al. forthcoming). Our paper therefore extends the typology and
specifically contributes to the elaboration of causal drivers.
Some authors have argued that the changes in renewable energy policy
in the context of the 2020 and 2030 directives, remain mere technicalities
(see Oberth€ur 2019). Our analysis suggests that a more differentiated view
is in order – while we observe a softening at the surface, there are indeed
hardening elements that have been introduced at the core to ensure some
minimum level of coordination of renewable energy governance among
the Member States. It is too soon to tell whether the 2030 framework and
the corresponding Energy Union will be more, less, or equally effective
when compared to the 2020 framework. The answer to this question
depends in part on the (as yet still unknown) final effects of the 2020
framework, as well as numerous factors that may affect the 2030 frame-
work. The latter depends to a significant degree on political will, that is,
‘a sufficient set of decision makers with a common understanding of a
particular problem on the formal agenda who are committed to support-
ing a commonly perceived, potentially effective policy solution’ (Post
et al. 2010: 671). Furthermore, the (successful) implementation of the
Energy Union rides on the political will of the new Commission under
President Ursula von der Leyen and the effort invested in this head-
line project.
The core contribution of this article therefore lies in unpacking some
of the causal factors that led to the policy and legal changes we observed.
Drawing on the introduction to this special issue (see Saurugger and
Terpan 2020), we argue that there are two broad factors that have influ-
enced the development of renewable energy legislation at the EU level:
the evolving international context, and especially, climate change negotia-
tions, as well as actor re-configurations within the EU, namely, the role
and relative strength of the Member States, as well as those of the
Commission and the Parliament. An important conclusion emerging
from this analysis is that contextual/international and domestic factors are
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closely interlinked. International negotiations and EU ambitions to lead
have fostered the urge to negotiate a new framework with a view to 2020/
2030, thus providing the general rhythm and pressure for renewable
energy policy activity. Many of the domestic debates at the EU level
emerged precisely because of the need to agree on an international frame-
work. By the same token, domestic developments have impacted the EU’s
ability to negotiate internationally, as, for example, disunity at home
impacts how one is viewed by others, as the EU came to painfully experi-
ence during the 2009 Copenhagen summit. Since then, the EU has
improved and adjusted its diplomatic efforts (e.g. B€ackstrand and
Elgstr€om 2013). Evidence from the case of renewable energy suggests that
the effects of softening and hardening law and governance are likely to
emerge at the interstitials of various causal factors, both at home
and abroad.
Future research should focus particularly on exploring the impact of
the harder and softer elements that we are currently observing, potentially
also in the context of other factors, such as institutions, entrepreneurship,
multilevel interactions, or crises. One fruitful avenue of work could be an
analysis of the National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) required by
the Governance Regulation once they become fully available (Knodt et al.
forthcoming; Schoenefeld and Jordan 2017). Scholars could, for example,
assess the extent to which the explanatory factors we unpacked in this
paper relate to actual policy outcomes; that is, did the Commission man-
age to strengthen its hand, or did Member States find ways to retain
more control over their national energy mix? Do similar trends towards
softening/hardening at the surface/core also appear in other policy areas?
Short-term successes may be deceptive, as the experience in Bulgaria and
Romania shows, where ‘EU targets and monitoring of member state [sic]
implementation has contributed to short-term compliance, but not sub-
stantive change’, potentially generating problems for the 2030 directive
(Davidescu et al. 2018: 621). Exploring such questions will allow us to
shed further light on the (re)emergence of harder soft governance, its ori-
gins and its future effectiveness. These insights will have significant impli-
cations for governing energy and, potentially, for many other policy fields
in the EU.
Notes
1. Reference: 03SFK4P0, Consortium ENavi, Kopernikus.
2. Approaches of soft and hard law originated from debates on international
law and have been dominated by legal scholars (e.g. Abbott and Snidal 2000).
In the EU context, related phenomena have typically been discussed as
aspects of soft and hard governance (e.g. Blomqvist 2016), an approach that
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political scientists frequently favour because it incorporates a wider range of
actors and effects (see Jacobsson 2004). This paper therefore examines the
former, but generally use the terminology and breadth of the latter.
3. Policy monitoring and reporting frequently involve multiple actors, such as
the Member States, the Commission and sometimes executive agencies. We
indicate throughout the article who monitors and reports. Further arguments
on the complexity of policy monitoring are available in Schoenefeld
et al. (2019).
4. A growing level of detail over time may also reflect learning effects in
reporting; see Schoenefeld et al. (2019).
5. http://www.ren21.net/
6. www.irena.org
7. We are grateful to one of our reviewers for highlighting this point.
8. We are grateful to Rainer M€uller for highlighting this point.
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